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In general relativity, ‘causal structure’ refers to the partial order on space-time points (or regions)
that encodes time-like relationships. Recently, quantum information and quantum foundations saw
the emergence of a ‘causality principle’. In the form used in this paper, which we call ‘process
terminality’, it states that when the output of a process is discarded, then the process itself may
as well be discarded. While causal structure and process terminality at first seem to be entirely
different notions, they become equivalent when making explicit what the partial order actually
encodes, that is, that an event in the past can influence one in its future, but not vice-versa. The
framework in which we establish this equivalence is that of process theories. We show how several
previous results are instances of this result and comment on how this framework could provide an
ideal, minimal canvas for crafting theories of quantum gravity.
Causal structure is the partial order on spacetime
points obtained by setting x ≤ y whenever x causally
precedes y. Starting with the first singularity theorems
[1, 2] causal structure has played a prominent role in Gen-
eral Relativity (GR). In fact, building further on [3–5],
in [6] it was shown that for globally hyperbolic space-
times, the entire spacetime can be reconstructed from
the partial order on spacetime points [30]. Hence, for an
important class of spacetimes, causal structure ‘is’ GR.
More recently, both within the context of quantum
information and quantum foundations, a new principle,
called simply causality, has been coined. Its initial aim
was to capture ‘no-signalling from the future’ within the
so-called operational probabilistic theories framework of
Chiribella, D’Ariano and Perinotti [7, 8]. A further gen-
eralisation of this axiom which makes sense for arbitrary
process theories [9–11] is the following [12–14]:
When the output of a process is discarded,
then the process itself may also be discarded.
(1)
Note that this principle also implies that when doing sci-
ence we can ignore processes of which the output never
reaches us before ending an experiment. Clearly, such
an assumption is absolutely crucial to being able to do
science at all, and hence, shouldn’t come as a surprise.
To avoid confusion, we refer to principle (1) as process
terminality. The generality of this definition is important
in that, unlike for its instantiation in [7, 8], it doesn’t
require a priori the distinction between quantum systems
and classical data or any reference to measurements or
probabilities, which is also the case in GR.
Using the diagrammatic language of process theories
which we explain below, process terminality is expressed
by the following equation:
f = (2)
Here f is a process and the ‘ground’-symbol represents a
special process with no outputs called discarding. Note in
particular that there is indeed no reference to measure-
ments, only to the general notion of a process, which
could either be classical, quantum, a hybrid of both
[11, 15], or even something that has nothing to do with
quantum or classical theory.
It has already been shown that from (2) one can in fact
derive ‘no-signalling’ for two parties [14]. This clearly
hints at the fact that there is a close connection between
(2) and the theory of relativity.
Still, a partially ordered set and axiom (2) look very
different. However, by explicitly equipping causal struc-
ture with its intended interpretation, namely that it en-
codes forward causation, we can establish equivalence of
causal structure and process terminality within the lan-
guage of process theories.
It has already been noted in the literature that no-
signalling is a strictly weaker notion than relativistic
causality [16]. By taking into account the causal struc-
ture of measurement events, one can put restrictions
on correlations observed in an experiment. Our work
demonstrates how no-signalling can be generalised as (2).
Our work also forms part of an ongoing effort in the
study of an operational form of causality in theories be-
yond quantum theory. On a related note, there have been
efforts to generalise the framework of Bayesian networks
developed by Pearl and others [17] to quantum theory
and beyond. Henson, Lal, and Pusey demonstrated that
certain operational conditional independences (like the
2no-signalling constraint) hold for classical data in an op-
erational probabilistic theory that satisfies causality; this
generalises the notion of d-separation as defined within
classical Bayesian networks [18].
It should be noted that the constraints in the work
of Henson, Lal, and Pusey are made upon classical data
embedded in a theory, and not objects within a general
theory itself. There has been recent, exciting progress
on developing a notion of quantum Bayesian network, or
quantum causal network where constraints can be im-
posed directly on quantum systems [19–23]. Note that
causal structure is distinct from the approach of associ-
ating a causal network with certain processes. In partic-
ular, given a specific causal structure, there are multiple
causal networks compatible with it, but a causal network
will often fix allowed causal structures.
Other related work includes the derivation by
Markopoulou and others of covariance in discrete causal
quantum structures [24, 25], or more general structures
akin to ones considered in this paper [12].
PROCESS THEORIES
By a process theory we mean a collection of systems,
represented by wires, and processes, represented by boxes
with wires as inputs (at the bottom of the box) and out-
puts (at the top) [10, 11]. Moreover, when we plug these
boxes together:
g
A
f h
B C
A
D
A
the resulting diagram should also be a process.
For the purposes of this paper, outputs should be con-
nected to inputs, and diagrams should never contain
causal loops. A diagram of processes with no directed
cycles is called a circuit. A state is a process without
inputs, and an effect is a process without outputs. Pro-
cesses without inputs or outputs are called numbers. In
the case of classical and quantum theory, these represent
probabilities.
Diagrams in process theories come with the interpre-
tation that wires allow for a flow of information. Hence,
if two processes are disconnected:
f g
there cannot be any information exchange between them.
This makes diagrams a useful mathematical tool to en-
code causation [12], generalising notions such as Bayesian
networks [17], which can be seen as such circuits whose
states are probability distributions and processes are con-
ditional probability distributions.
Generalising states and processes to include density
operators and CP-maps, one can capture the essential
structure of quantum theory, including quantum-classical
interaction and complementarity [11].
PROCESS TERMINALITY
We will assume that for each system in a process theory
there exists a designated discarding effect:
For a process, terminality means that (2) holds, and for
a process theory, it means that it holds for all processes.
When viewing probability theory as a process theory,
discarding a classical system A amounts to summing over
all of its possible values [11]. Hence, terminality for states
means that
∑
a
P (A = a) = 1, and terminality for pro-
cesses means that for all a ∈ A,
∑
b
P (B = b|A = a) = 1.
When viewing quantum theory as a process theory,
discarding of quantum systems is the trace [11]. Hence,
terminality means that density matrices have diagonal
one, and that CP-maps are trace-preserving.
CAUSAL STRUCTURE
We will now explicitly encode the condition that only
events in the causal past of a particular event can have
an impact on that event.
To any causal structure, we can associate a diagram
of processes as follows. For each node A in the causal
structure, we introduce a new box (also labelled A) with
an input Ai and an output Ao. Then, we introduce a
wire from an A-labelled box to a B-labelled box if and
only if B is a successor of A in the causal structure:
B
D
C
E
A
7→ B
D
C
E
A
Bi
Bo
Ao
Ai
Co
Ci
Do
Di
Eo
Ei
(3)
We say an event A is capable of affecting an event B if
and only if, by changing the input at Ai one is able to
3affect the output at Bo. Operationally, we can interpret
this an observer at A being able to send a message to an
observer at B. However, we can also choose to treat this
as a purely formal notion of a happening at A impacting a
happening atB, without making reference to an observer.
It should be the case the the only events capable of
affecting a given event are those in its causal past. How-
ever, by simply considering diagrams of processes which
decompose according to a given causal structure as in
(3) without any further constraints, it is easy to pick
processes in some process theory where an event B can
be affected by events not in its causal past. For example,
ignoring A’s input and B’s output, by means of a Bell
state and a Bell effect, written as a cap-shaped and a
cup-shaped wire respectively [10, 11, 26], there is a clear
information flow from future to past:
Bi
Ao
The underlying reason is of course that Bell-effects can-
not be performed with certainty, and hence do not con-
stitute a single box in a causal theory.
We will constrain process theories such that the output
of a given process only depends on what happened in
the causal past of that process, and hence, for example,
they will not contain Bell-effects. We will say that these
process theories respect causal structure.
Suppose we have a circuit Φ whose boxes are:
B := {A,B,C, . . .}
with each box A having input Ai and output Ao. One
can represent this circuit as one big box:
Bo := {Ao, Bo, Co, . . .}
Φ
...
...
Bi := {Ai, Bi, Ci, . . .}
Now, write A ≤ B if A = B or there exists a directed
path of wires from box A to box B in the circuit Φ. Then
for any subset of boxes E ⊆ B, let past(E) be the boxes
in the causal past of E , i.e.
past(E) := {A | ∃B ∈ E : A ≤ B}
Then the outputs Eo of the boxes in E should only be
affected by the inputs past(E)i of the boxes in past(E).
In other words, discarding all of the outputs of Φ except
for Eo should give the following factorisation:
past(E)i
Eo
Φ
... ...
... ...
=
...
past(E)i
Eo
...
...
Φ′ (4)
for some process process Φ′. Indeed, concerning outputs
Eo (cf. we discard the other outputs in LHS), the inputs
not in past(E)i must be discarded (cf. RHS) as they may
not affect Eo. Hence we can conclude that a process
theory respects causal structure if (4) is satisfied for all
circuits Φ and subsets E .
PROOF OF EQUIVALENCE
Theorem. A process theory respects causal structure if
and only if it is terminal.
Proof. First suppose a process theory respects causal
structure. Then, we can treat every process as a circuit
Φ for a single node A:
A
Ao
Ai
The set of boxes of Φ is the singleton {A}. The only
subset of B giving a non-trivial expression for (4) is E :=
∅. This gives:
A
Ao
Ai
=
Ai
which is exactly the terminality equation (2).
Conversely, suppose every process in a process theory
satisfies the terminality equation (2). Fix a circuit Φ, a
subset E ⊆ B, and let Φ|E be the sub-circuit of Φ whose
boxes are in past(E). For example, taking Φ from (3),
and E := {B,C} yields:
B
D
C
E
A
Bi
Bo
Ao
Ai
Co
Ci
Do
Di
Eo
Ei
Φ|E
(5)
4Then, let Φ′ be Φ|E with all of the outputs not in Eo
discarded. In the example above, Eo = {Bo, Co}, so:
B C
A
Bi
Bo
Ao
Ai
Co
CiΦ′
Ai Bi Ci
Bo Co
:=
Since E ⊆ past(E), the outputs of Φ′ will be Eo, and
since past(E) is downward closed (i.e. it contains all of
the boxes in its causal past), its inputs will be past(E)i.
Thus it remains to show that discarding the outputs
Φo\Eo causes the boxes in B\past(E) to vanish, leaving
their inputs discarded.
Call a box maximal in the circuit if its outputs are not
connected to another box. Since past(E) is downward
closed, then either B\past(E) contains a maximal box
or it is empty. If B\past(E) is empty we are done, so
suppose it contains a maximal box A. Since none of the
outputs of A are in Eo, they are all discarded in the LHS
of (4). Hence we can apply (2) to remove A and discard
its inputs. For example, we can choose a maximal box
E ∈ B\past(E) in diagram (5) and apply Equation (2)
to obtain:
B
D
C
E
A
Bi
Bo
Ao
Ai
Co
Ci
Do
Di
Eo
Ei
= B
D
C
A
Bi
Bo
Ao
Ai
Co
Ci
Do
Di
Ei
The set past(E) remains downward closed, so we can
repeat this procedure, choosing the next maximal box not
in past(E) until nothing but Φ′ and the discarded inputs
of B\past(E) are left. Hence we obtain (4) for all circuits
Φ, so the process theory respects causal structure.
RE-CASTING PREVIOUS WORKS
Diagrams with associated causal structure:
A B
C
where we moreover take the local input and output at
C to be trivial (i.e. no input/output) result in the Bell-
scenario typical for evaluating whether a theory is sig-
nalling:
A B
C
Ai
Ao Bo
Bi
When restricting ‘respecting causal structure’ in the
statement of our theorem to these Bell-scenarios, the
equivalence still holds, provided all diagrams with no in-
puts or outputs coincide. In this manner we recover the
proof of no-signalling from terminality of [13, 14].
Similarly, we can recover generalised covariance as in
[12, 14], which generalised earlier results in [24, 25].
CONCLUSION
In (2) we have found a substitute for the idea of a
causal structure, which has a very simple form, as well
as a very clear interpretation, and we pointed out that
(2) is absolutely crucial to being able to do science at all.
Condition (2) moreover applies to arbitrary process
theories and hence provides a starting point for crafting
new causal theories. The upshot is that one does not need
any prior commitment to a particular causal structure
and can be readily generalised to conditions on processes
which exhibit indefinite causal structure, as shown in [27].
Such processes include the quantum switch [28] and the
causally non-separable processes of Oreskov, Costa, and
Bruker [29]. Hence, this paves the way for crafting toy
theories where there is an important interaction between
causal structure and quantum structure, and ultimately,
this could pave a way to a theory of quantum gravity.
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